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Ho. OF REPS. 
Mr. BAKER, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, made the following 
REPORT: 
The Committee on Indian Affairs, to whom was referred the memorial of 
Fleming l'Vood, submitted the following report: 
The memorialist alleges that in July, 1837, he formed a partnership 
with one Egbert Harris in a mercantile house at Fort Smith, Arkansas, 
under the name of Wood & Harris; that said firm obtained from the agent 
of the Cherokee nation of Indians a license to trade in said nation, accord-
ing to law, having first obtained the unanimous consent of the council of 
said nation; that they erected a suitable building for the purpose of said 
trade, on the Arkansas river, opposite Fort Smith, and supplied it with 
goods, and by their agents commenced trade under the license aforesaid; 
but that before the partners themselves had reached the place, their goods 
were seized by the officers of the government, and their" house closed, at 
an immense sacrifice of feeling, credit, and money." He further alleges 
that said Wood &'Harris were then "sued for libel" in the United States 
district court at Little Rock, and were put to great expense and trouble in 
travelling from Natchez to Little Rock, and in feeing attorneys, &c., for 
defending themselves in said suit, until the final determination thereof, in 
October, 1839, by a verdict in favor of the defendants; that the petitioner 
became, by a dissolution of the finn of Wood & Harris before the deter-
mination of said suit as aforesaid, the sole party in interest in said suit, and 
the sole owner of the goods and other effects of said partnership. He also 
alleges that when the goods, seized as aforesaid, were finally restored to 
him, they were damaged and rendered nearly worthless by moth, mildew, 
and rust. He therefore claims that for the loss, detention, and deteriora-
tion of said goods, the value of the building erected for the trade aforesaid, 
the expense incurred in defending said suit, and the immense sacrifice of 
credit which he sustained by the proceedings aforesaid, (all of which was 
occasioned by the officers of the United States,) the government should pay 
him the sum of ten thousand dollars. 
From the papers accompanying the memo.rial, the following :fucts are · 
very clearly proved: 
Messrs. Wood& Harris (who appear to have been residents at Natchez) 
had a trading-house at Fort Smith, within the territory of the Cherokee 
nation. In July, 1837, they obtained from M. Stokes, esq., the Cherokee 
agent, a license to establish another trading-house on the Arlmnsas river, 
within sight of the fort, where their other store was situated. This license· 
Blair &Rives, print. 
2 Rep. No. 120. 
was granted by the proper authority, and agreeably to the provisie>ns of 
the 2d section of the act " to regulate trade and intercourse with the In-
dian tribes," approved J nne 30, 1834. The same section of the act au-
thorizes the superintendent of the district to revoke and cancel a license 
whenever, in his opinion, it would be improper to permit the person li-
censed to remain in the Indian country. Superintendents have, also, by 
the 3d section of the act of June 30,1834, "to provide for the organization 
of the department of Indian affairs," a general control over all matters per-
taining to the welfare of the Indians within their district, according to such 
regulations as shall be established by the President of the United States; 
and one of these regulations requires the superintendents to exercise a 
control over the subject of the trade and intercourse between the Indians 
and citizens of the United States; and without the license required by the 
act :first above cited, no trade with the Indians by citizens of the United 
States is allowed. At the time of granting the license by the agent of the 
Cherokees to Wood & Harris, William Armstrong, esq., was the acting 
superintendent of the Indians for the western territory, and the place des-
ignated in the license for carrying on the trade was within his jurisdiction. 
On the 9th of September, 1837, Mr. Armstrong addressed a letter to the 
Cherokee agent, Stokes, inquiring whether he had granted a license to 
these parties, and saying " If you have, I regret to say that I will be under 
the disagreeable necessity of revoking said license, as it is the policy of 
the government to keep the Indians from visiting the line as much as pos~ 
sible, to prevent the introduction of liquor into the Indian country, and 
other violations of law. In granting licenses to traders, they should be 
located only at certain suitable and convenient places. The location of a 
trading-house at tltat point, instead of being convenient to the Indians, 
would be the means of drawing them from their homes, and bringing them 
into contact with the authorities and citizens of Arkansas; which should 
be avoided if possible.. I hope you will, upon reflection, agree with me 
upon the propriety of my course." 
On the 26th of the same September, the Cherokee agent, Governor Stokes, 
replied to the above letter, declining himself to revoke the license to Wood 
& Harris, and referring tbe matter back to the superintendent, to whos.e 
better means of judging of the circumstances, from being in the neighbor-
h<Jod of the establishment, he defers. He says, in the same letter: "As 
it is altogether impossible for r:ne to select suitable places for trade, I have 
uniformly left it to the traders themselves to choose their own stations, and 
have granted them licenses accordingly." 
On the 12th of December, 1837, Mr. Armstrong, the superintendent, 
notified \Vood & Harris that their license was revoked; that he had sub· 
mitted the case for approval or disapproval to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs at ·washington, and required them to suspend all trade with the 
Indians until the action of the Commis~ioner on the subject should be 
communicated to him; stating to them, in the same notice, that it would 
have been given to them sooner, but for the absence of both of them from 
Fort Smith. On the same day he submitted the case in writing to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. On the 13th of January, 1838, Wood 
& Harris wrote to the Commissioner at \'Vashington a statement explan-
atory of their views of the case, and in justification of their conduct. 
On the 20th of Jan nary, 1838, the Commissioner of Indian. Affairs in-
formed Armstrong, the superintendent, that he had fully examined the 
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case, and entirely approved of the revocation of the license of Wood & 
Harris: and of this Colonel Armstrong informed them on the 28th of Feb-
ruary, 1838. In the mean time, the Commissioner, on the l 3th of Febru-
ary, had sent to Wood & Harris copi.esofthe letter of the superintendent, 
referring the case to the department here; and of the letter of the Com-
missioner to Armstrong, informing him of the approval by the department 
of his revocation of the license. Notwithstanding these proceedings, Wood 
& Harris continued their trade with the Indians as before. In this con-
dition of affairs, the superintendent directed Captain John Stuart, of the 
7th United States infantry, to seize the goods of Wood & Harris, take 
possession of their store, and to remove them from the Indian country; 
and, on the 21st of April, 1838, in pursuance of this order, Captain Stuart 
sent a command under Lieutenant McKavett, and seized the goods, took 
a complete inventory of them, and turned them over to the marshal of the 
State of Arkansas. The goods were valued in said inventory at about 
sixteen hundred dollars. 
At the next term of the United States district court in Arkansas, the 
United States attorney for said district caused the said goods to be libelled 
as forfeited to the United States, for a violation of the act of June 30, 
1834, styled "An act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian 
tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontiers." Of these proceedings, due 
notice was given to V\rood & Harris. At the next term of the court, in 
November, 1838, the action was continued by consent of parties; and 
leave was given to the attorneys to take out cornrnissiom; for taking tes-
timony in the case. At the following term (to wit: on the 1st day of April, 
1839) Wood & Harris filed their answer to the libel, to which a general 
replication was put in by consent; and the action was continued, with 
leave to the partie~ to take certain depositions, to the next term of said 
court, in June following. The court ordered a jury to be summoned for 
the trial of said cause on the 24th of that month; and on the morning of 
that day, on motion of Wood o/' Harris, supported by affidavit, the cause 
was orderea to be continued to the next term; and at that term (to wit: on 
the 4th of November, 1839) a verdict was rendered in said court in favor 
of said Wood & Harris. At the same time, a decree of restoration was 
entered for the claimants, and the court ordered it to be certified of record 
that "there was probable cause for the seizure cif the goods, 'Wares, and 
merchandise mentioned in the libel in the case, and in the inventory there-
with.filed." The goods were accordingly restored to the claimants, 'Vood 
& Harris. 
At the 1st session of the 26th Congress, the petitioner applied for relief, 
and his petition was referred, in the Senate, to the Committee on Claims; 
on whose report, (see Senate documents, 1st sess. 26th Congress, vol. 5, 
No. 198,) that body resolved that the prayer of the petitioner ought not to 
be {!ranted. 
rrhe papers were brought to this House, and referred, without any ad-
ditional evidence, to this committee. · 
From an examination of the law applicable to this case, and of the facts 
as shown by the memorialist himself, the committee cannot doubt the 
authority of the superintendent to revoke the license of the trade·rs in this 
case, the expediency of his exercising that authority, or the fact that he 
did exercise it. But the jury who tried the cause came to a different re-
sult, (upon what grounds or evidence it does not appear, nor is it material,) 
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and declare, by their finding, that the memorialists were not at the time 
trading without a license, as alleged in the libel, and that their goods were 
unlawfully seized and detained by the government. The goods were 
ordered to be restored, and were restored; and the controversy is, judi-
cially, at an end. . 
But the petitioner now comes to the legislature, and claims to be indem-
nified for the damage which he' bas sustained by the detention of his goods 
white thus under libel, and the injury which he alleges was done them 
while thus detained; for the costs and expenses of his defence, including 
his own time, travel, trouble, and his attorney's fees; for the consequen-
tial damage which he has suffered by the breaking up of his business; 
and for injury to his credit and character, by means of the prosecution. 
He shows no circumstances of peculiar hardship in his case, or anything 
to distinguish it from the hundreds of cases occurring every year, in 
which the government unsuccessfully prosecutes an individual, or pro-
ceeds against his property, for an alleged violation of its laws. It js not 
attempted to be proved in thi;s case, nor is it even alleged, that the officers 
of the government acted from malicious or corrnpt motives. On the con-
trary, it appears from the petitioner's own showing that all their conduct 
was characterized by the greatest clemency and forbearance. The most 
ample notice was given by them; the least possible force was used, and 
only so much as was necessary to overcome the resistance ·which was 
oppose<l to them; an<l as to the alleged detention of the petitioner's goods 
by unreasonable delays of the proceedings in court, the record prodnced 
by the petitioner shows that there were none to which he did not consent 
at the time, and that one of the continuances was on his own motion, and 
against the wishes of the government. 
The judge who tried the cause entered upon the l'ecord a certificate 
that there was probable cause for the seizure of the goods. 
Unless, therefore, the House is willing to adopt and apply, generally, the 
principle of indemnifying all persons who have been acquitted by the 
verdicts of juries in prosecutions instituted by the government against 
them, not only for the costs and expenses of their defence, but for all 
damages which they may have sustained, whether direct or consequential, 
immediate or remote, by reason of the prosecution, (including injuries to 
the character as well as to the property,) the committee can see neither 
the propriety nor the justice of granting the prayer of this petition. They 
therefore, concurring with the committee of the Senate who examined 
the case five years ago, recommend the adoption of the following resolu-
tion: 
Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioner ought not to be granted. 
